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Euroscepticism: a Mobilising 
appeal? not for Everyone! 1
OLGA GYÁRFÁŠOVÁ
abstract: This study examines the changing role of the EU agenda in Slovak politics. 
It identifies old and newly emerging faces of Euroscepticism and compares them with 
general theoretical concepts. Furthermore, it asks to what extent Eurosceptical appeals 
mobilised Slovak voters in the European Parliament (EP) elections of 2014 and whether 
Eurosceptical parties represent a meaningful electoral choice for voters. In the past, 
many analyses have provided evidence that the European agenda is not salient and 
the EU political arena is perceived as one where there is less at stake. Nevertheless, the 
economic crisis and so ‑called Greek bailout were followed by a rise in Euroscepticism 
and EU ‑criticism. In some EU countries, this enhanced voter mobilisation in the EP elec‑
tions. In others – including Slovakia – we saw not only a significant decline in electoral 
turnout but relatively poor results for Eurosceptical parties as well. This study identifies 
the factors behind abstention and explores voting patterns in this specific second ‑order 
election in Slovakia. Moreover, it investigates how the parties are perceived in terms of 
their positions on EU integration and the potential impact on voter choices. I conclude 
that the EU agenda is still not the deciding factor for voters even in the case of EP 
elections. Eurosceptical appeals are less mobilising in this context, and the public sees 
no differences among parties’ stances on the EU.
Keywords: European Parliament elections, Euroscepticism, Eurosceptical appeals, 
electoral turnout, abstention factors, party and public positions on the EU agenda
introduction
‘This time it’s different!’ announced a major mobilisation campaign by Euro‑
pean Parliament for the 2014 elections. Under “different,” we may understand 
the changes brought to the EP by the Lisbon Treaty: more competencies, and 
1 Work on this paper was supported by research grant APVV 0309-11 for the project Slovak Society in 
International Comparative Surveys: Before and during the Crises.
 The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful and constructive com-
ments which greatly contributed to improving the final version of this study.
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in particular, a closer connection between European voters’ decision and the 
filling of the position of head of the European executive. The 2014 EP elections 
were, thus, expected to be more personalised, but also – due to the economic 
crisis and increased Euroscepticism across the EU – more politicised. The ‘this 
time it’s different’ slogan seemed to foreshadow greater interest and a higher 
election turnout.
This was confirmed in several member states (Great Britain, Greece, Roma‑
nia and Lithuania) albeit at the price of a rise in support for Eurosceptical and 
Euro ‑critical parties. In many Central and East European countries, however, 
the trend in voter participation moved in the opposite direction. With voter 
turnout at 13%, Slovakia again set a record for non ‑participation, surpassing 
its own lows in 2004 (17%) and 2009 (19.6%). This “abstention champion” was 
closely followed by the Czech Republic where participation reached only 18% 
(five years earlier, it had been 28%), Poland (23%) and the EU family’s new‑
est member, Croatia (25%). Ten years after entering this prestigious club and 
a quarter century after the fall of undemocratic regimes when a “return to 
Europe” was a yearned for goal, the majority of citizens in this part of the EU 
stayed away from the polls.
As we have noted, Euroscepticism presented a successful mobilising strategy 
in this election more than at any time before. The troublesome ratification of 
the Lisbon Treaty, the consequences of economic crises, the bailout and other 
incentives related to the urgent state of the euro – all these factors contributed 
to the eruption of Eurosceptical parties in 2014. In most cases, this was right‑
‑wing Euroscepticism closely connected to nationalism, xenophobia and anti‑
‑immigration slogans.2 In journalistic jargon, the EP election results were even 
labelled a ‘Eurosceptic “earthquake”’ rocking EU elections.3
Yet in some countries including Slovakia, these Eurosceptical appeals did 
not mobilise voters. Various nationalist and Eurosceptical parties – both old and 
new – fell well below the 5% threshold and had only very marginal support. The 
Slovak National Party (SNS), in particular, failed to defend its one seat in the 
EP, receiving only 3.6% of valid votes. Similarly, the feared right ‑wing extremist 
2 To name only the most relevant examples across the EU: the National Front in France won 25% of votes 
and electoral support for the UKIP grew by 12 percentage points, making it the strongest party in the 
UK, with almost 27% of votes. The Danish Eurosceptical People’s Party also recorded one of the best 
election results for a party of this type; with 27% of votes, it doubled its MEP numbers and is now the 
biggest Danish party in the EP. Within the post -Communist countries, Hungary’s extreme -right party 
Jobbik was most successful, receiving 15% of votes. For more details, see http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/elections2014-results/en/election -results-2014.html (8 July 2015).
 For the purpose of this study, whose focus is primarily Slovakia, we do not deal with radical left -wing 
Eurosceptical appeals. In the 2014 EP elections, however, it was above all the Greek far -left party Syriza 
which made a breakthrough with 26% of votes.
3 Eurosceptic ‘earthquake’ which rocks EU elections.” BBC New Europe: available at: http://www.bbc.com/
news/world -europe-27559714 (26 May 2014).
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People’s Party – Our Slovakia (ĽSNS), led by Marián Kotleba (Governor of the 
Banská Bystrica region), claimed only 1.7% of votes.4 
This study examines the changing role of the EU agenda in Slovak politics: it 
identifies old and newly emerging faces of Euroscepticism and compares them 
drawing on general theoretical concepts. It also analyses these faces of Slovak 
Euroscepticism using party manifestos for the 2012 general election and the 
2014 EP election. Based on these analyses of the election results and the findings 
of a post ‑election survey, this work asks to what extent Eurosceptical appeals 
mobilised Slovak voters in the 2014 EP election and whether Eurosceptical par‑
ties are a meaningful electoral choice for voters. This research also identifies 
the factors behind abstention and explores voting patterns in this particular 
second ‑order election in Slovakia. Moreover, it questions how the parties are 
perceived in terms of their positions on EU integration, the congruence between 
voter and party perceptions and how all these issues might affect voting choices.
How should We conceptualise Euroscepticism?
The term “Euroscepticism” is notoriously elusive, broad and difficult to concep‑
tualise, let alone to measure. Euroscepticism was initially a distinctly British 
phenomenon; it expressed British distance and “otherness” in relation to Con‑
tinental Europe and/or the project of EU integration. A more critical European 
discourse emerged during the debates over the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty in the early 1990 s, and since those years, a variety of forms of Euro‑
scepticism have emerged and started to have increasing prominencein the EU 
member states. Among the first studies attempting to conceptualise this very 
complex and fuzzy concept were works by Paul Taggart (1998), Aleks Szczer‑
biak (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002) and Kopecky and Mudde (2002). As Sofia 
Vasilopoulou rightly points out: ‘As a result of this implicit exceptionality and 
novelty of the phenomenon, the literature has mostly treated it [Euroscepticism] 
as a “dependent” variable. In doing so, it has used the theoretical and analytical 
tools available in order to “understand” its nature’ (2013: 153).
In their formative work (2002), Kopecky and Mudde set out two dimensions to 
allow for a more precise understanding of parties’ positions vis ‑á‑vis the EU and 
Europe: 1. diffuse support for European integration at the level of ideas and ideals; 
2. specific support for the EU at the level of practice. By combining them, we can 
classify four theoretical types: Euro ‑enthusiasts; Euro ‑pragmatists; Euro ‑sceptics 
and Euro ‑rejects, where Euro ‑sceptics are a combination of EU ‑pessimists at the 
level of EU practice and Europhiles at that of ideas. Even a glance at this typology 
4 Among the more marginal nationalistic and Eurosceptical parties, we can include Nation and Justice 
(which won 1.38% of votes in the election), Law and Justice (1.66%), the Slovak People’s Party (0.46%) 
and the Christian Slovak National Party (0.64%). All in all, 29 parties and 333 candidates contested the 
EP election in Slovakia.
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makes clear that there are many different empirical cases which would not fit into 
this scheme; still, this typology enables us to begin sorting them out.
Taggart and Szczerbiak have distinguished between hard and soft Euroscep‑
ticism (2002), while Chris Flood has identified a six ‑point continuum along 
which party positions towards the EU may be situated (Flood 2002). Its poles 
are rejectionist vs. maximalist, with revisionist, minimalist, gradualist and 
reformist positions situated in between.
Though the above classifications have focused primarily on party ‑based 
Euroscepticism, Eurosceptic views can also be analysed from a public opinion 
perspective. Sorensen (2008) identifies four broad ideal types of public Euro‑
scepticism. According to her analyses, Euroscepticism can have an economic 
character or be sovereignty ‑based (reflecting the claim that EU cooperation 
should not challenge national sovereignty). The third type is labelled “demo‑
cratic Euroscepticism” and has to do with the democratic deficit associated with 
EU ‑level governance. Finally, the fourth type is more political and evaluates the 
EU according to broadly the same cleavages that characterise national politics 
(Sorensen 2008: 8).
Sorensen tested these types of public Euroscepticism in three countries – 
Denmark, France and the UK – highlighting that Danish and British societies 
are characterised by a strong sovereignty ‑based Euroscepticism (combined also 
with an economic one in the UK’s case) while the French share a strong social 
Euroscepticism (Sorensen 2008: 9).
Analogously, we can distinguish the sources of Euroscepticism in terms of 
whether they are based on party or public attitudes. McLaren, for instance, 
separates economic, cultural and institutional factors and points to two distinct 
paths: one rooted in cultural threats and the other in perceived economic losses. 
Further on, she notes that institutional distrust motivates Euroscepticism. 
According to her evidence, while the direct effect of institutional trust runs 
through EU institutions, EU and national institutions tend to be distrusted 
together (McLaren 2002: 513).
All these categories are based on EU ‑related developments in the older 
member states. They are also partially applicable in countries that joined the 
club in 2004 or later. We may recall the pre ‑accession expectations in regard to 
Eurosceptical positions in post ‑Communist countries. Cas Mudde, for example, 
conceptualised the potential conflict in terms of a centre ‑periphery cleavage. 
Shortly before the Big Bang enlargement in 2004, he expected that ‘one pos‑
sible way in which EU accession could influence party competition in the new 
member states is in transforming the already present regional divide into a full 
populist, anti ‑EU center ‑periphery cleavage’ (Mudde 2004: 2). Furthermore, 
he pointed out that Euroscepticism would mix populism with frustration at the 
periphery. The centre ‑periphery divide and a national populist anti ‑EU position 
would also make for a perfect combination because it had links back to the clas‑
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sic populist discourse of the 1920 s and 1930 s in this region. That discourse 
had posited that the key struggle was between rural and “national” people, and 
the urban and cosmopolitan elite (Mudde 2004: 7).
However, the model of winners ‑losers of integration and a centre ‑periphery 
divide did not work very well, at least not in Slovakia: people in the poorer 
regions saw EU funds as a means to achieve balance with more developed re‑
gions, not to mention the capital. In addition, the Europhoria was general and 
widespread across very different social environments. Hardly any EU ‑sceptical 
feeling could be mobilised before the economic crises and the “Greek” bailout 
debate, which emerged in 2010. Although radical right ‑wing and nationalistic 
parties presented EU integration as a threat to national sovereignty and cultural 
identity, these appeals had very limited impact on the public mood.
Of course, there are variations in the salience of EU integration across the 
Union; factors like low ‑level EU politicisation and the significance of Euro‑
scepticism strongly depend on individual national party systems and national 
contexts. In 2008, shortly before the outbreak of the economic crisis, Paul 
Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak identified three categories of countries based on 
national surveys: these were states where EU integration was 1) of hardly any 
relevance; 2) the subject of an open, coherent and intense political debate (the 
Czech Republic, for example, was included in this category); 3) the subject of 
a highly incoherent and changing debate (Taggart – Szczerbiak 2008). Most 
Central and Eastern European countries, including Slovakia, belong in the third 
category (Hartleb 2011: 24).
We turn now to the forms of Euroscepticism active on the recent Slovakian 
political scene. We will focus on party ‑based Euroscepticism and analyse this 
using the concepts set out above.
Emerging Faces of Euroscepticism in slovakia
When it comes to public perceptions of EU membership and participation in 
the EP elections, Slovakia presents an interesting case. Though it has one of the 
most EU ‑phile publics across the EU‑28,5 the country has historically recorded 
5 For instance, in autumn 2011, 48% of Slovaks expressed their trust in the EU while the average in the EU-27 
was just 34%. (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb76/eb76_fact_sk_en.pdf, 8 July 2015). 
In another example, in the spring of 2010, 78% of Slovaks believed that their country was benefitting 
from EU membership whereas the EU-27 average figure was 53%. Moreover, 59% of the Slovak public 
thought that EU membership was a good thing but the same question was answered positively by only 
49% of EU-27 citizens (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb73/eb73_fact_sk_en.pdf, 8 
July 2015).
 We can also look at the more recent results of a Standard Eurobarometer survey conducted in autumn 
2014. These findings indicate that after a brief downswing, the tide is turning: trust in the EU and its 
institutions has increased since the last survey in spring 2014; Slovak citizens feel that they are EU citizens 
to a greater extent than average EU citizens do (the figure was 73% in Slovakia compared to 63% across 
the EU28). The indicator “confidence in the EU” was also higher in Slovakia than the EU average, and 
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the lowest turnout in all EP elections. The country’s integration trajectory drew 
attention in the late 1990 s when the country was labelled the “black hole” of 
Central Europe. After 1998, however, it was seen to be back on the “right track” 
and busily catching up with its initially more successful neighbours. Within 
a very short time, Slovakia, thus, turned from a “troubled candidate” into 
a “loyal member,” meaning that it could be characterised by its “policy ‑taking” 
rather than “policy ‑setting” position. However, the image of the good pupil 
changed dramatically in October 2011 when Slovak parliament was the only 
parliament in the Eurozone to vote against measures to bolster the powers of 
the Eurozone bailout fund – a step seen as vital to combat the bloc’s debt crisis. 
In fact, the impression created was rather misleading: only one of the govern‑
ing coalition’s four parties, the neoliberal Freedom and Solidarity (SaS), had 
opposed the bailout and abstained6 while the other three had voted in favour. 
The largest opposition party, Smer ‑Social Democracy also supported the bailout 
but abstained when then Prime Minister Iveta Radičová made the vote one of 
confidence in the government in the hope of bringing SaS into line. Only the 
smaller nationalist SNS actually voted against the bailout. However, the failure 
of more than half the parliamentary deputies to support the measure led to its 
defeat and the fall of the government. Just a few days later, when early elections 
had been agreed on, the majority of government and opposition deputies united 
and approved the measure. The parliamentary elections of March 2012 returned 
a centre ‑left government to power, with Robert Fico leading a single ‑party gov‑
ernment with a formal majority. Since then, Slovak government policies have 
resumed their clearly pro ‑EU attitude. The role of the EU agenda has changed to 
some extent as it becomes more prominent and emerges as a potential subject 
for political debate. Nevertheless, the added EU content has not led to more – 
or, at any rate, significantly more – political contest. In other words, political 
competition over the EU agenda remains low profile and EU matters have less 
salience than domestic issues.
The weak politicisation of the EU at the level of domestic politics is a general 
phenomenon. The EU agenda has often been depicted as a ‘sleeping giant’ (de 
Vries 2007) which does not interfere in domestic politics but rather represents 
dormant potential. For Slovakia, some country ‑specific conditions can be iden‑
49% of the country’s respondents had trust in the EU. Moreover, half of those surveyed agreed with the 
view that the EU contributes to the achievement of a better life in Europe; two -thirds of Slovak citizens 
also agreed that the EU contributes to the social protection of its citizens while 63% said that the EU 
has sufficient power and tools to protect the economic interests of Europe on the global stage. See 
Standard Eurobarometer 82. Fall 2014. http://ec.europa.eu/slovensko/news/eurobarometer82_sk.htm
 More empirical evidence about the Slovak public’s pro -EU bias can be found in the Standard Euroba-
rometer regular surveys available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm (8 July 2015).
6 SaS said it was opposed to Slovakia’s taxpayers being asked to cover the debts of richer countries. This 
opinion reflected the widespread public mood: many felt that Slovakia should not have to bail out 
countries like Greece, which were better off.
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tified. Unlike the Czech Republic, where this sentiment was largely exhibited 
in the person of ex ‑president Václav Klaus, Slovakia did not display any open, 
party ‑based Euroscepticism and relevant public actors did not criticise EU in‑
tegration. As Karen Henderson has pointed out of countries like Slovakia with 
a difficult accession trajectory: ‘the major EU debate was not about what Slovak 
parties wanted from the EU in policy terms, or what sort of EU they wanted, 
but rather about what the EU required from Slovakia and who could deliver 
it’ (Henderson 2009: 535). She notes further that ‘EU accession is a valence 
issue: it is generally accepted in the political discourse as a “good thing”, but 
the ability to achieve it is the contested political issue’ (Henderson 2009: 535).
After Slovakia’s accession to the EU, the broad consensus about the strategic 
importance of EU membership turned into a comfortable but passive consen‑
sus about the European agenda and Slovakia’s performance in the Union. This 
corresponds with the famous “permissive consensus” typical of established EU 
members in the earlier decades of their membership. Unsurprisingly, this situa‑
tion stimulated no political or public discussion on EU matters; with only minor 
exceptions, these issues had no profile during those first years of EU membership 
either as part of the agenda of the political parties or in the public discourse.
Another consequence of the broad pre ‑accession consensus (and the very 
undeveloped and unstructured debate on the “pros” and “cons” of being part 
of the European Union) was that Slovakia’s membership was viewed mostly 
instrumentally. This was very much true not only for the political elites, but 
also for the broader public.
For Slovaks, EU membership was a means to finally escape from the wrong 
side of the “Iron Curtain” and achieve modernisation and EU funding benefits. 
On the other hand, it was not so much a way to improve the country’s inter‑
national position or have a say in European matters. Slovaks were too inward‑
‑looking and had too limited an awareness of international affairs to claim 
those benefits.
The EU agenda proved more successful as a mass mobilisation tool for par‑
ties that managed to instrumentalise the EU as either a guarantee of economic 
improvements or a scapegoat for the misery. EU ‑critical or EU ‑sceptical positions 
were absent from the political mainstream. That situation changed in the 2012 
national election. When the early general election took place because of the gov‑
ernment’s collapse on EFSF vote, the EU agenda emerged as a new phenomenon 
in the domestic political competition. In addition to enthusiastic and more or 
less indifferent stances on the EU, some new faces of Euroscepticism emerged.
In the 2012 general election campaign, two different types of Euroscepti‑
cism – one nationalistic and the other (neo)liberal – surfaced and they continued 
to be its most visible faces in the 2014 EP election.
The sections below describe the content – both current and historical – of 
each of these stances.
Euroscepticism – a Mobilising Appeal? Not for All! Olga Gyarfášová38
The Nationalistic Version: the EU as an Enemy of National Sovereignty
The textbook example of fringe nationalism being used against global institu‑
tions, the West and the EU can be found in the Slovak National Party (SNS)’s de‑
nunciation of EFSF as ‘a mega ‑betrayal of the Slovak nation.’ The nationalists’ 
arguments went further to the loss of (national) sovereignty and the need to 
avoid being ‘the servants of the West’ (Vernosť Slovensku., 2012: 1). Their Eu‑
roscepticism, thus, followed the “pattern” of radical right ‑wing parties such as 
the True Finns and the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ).
In the 2012 election campaign, the SNS took as its theme ‘rich Greeks or Ital‑
ians living beyond their means and causing trouble to the poor who maintain 
tight budgets’; this was, it claimed, an ‘ineffective principle for lazy countries to 
which the SNS will respond by requiring the introduction of a minimum average 
European labour cost and increasing salaries’ (Vernosť Slovensku., 2012: 3). 
Moreover, the SNS was the first parliamentary party to cross the Rubicon by con‑
sidering the alternative of leaving the EU and Eurozone altogether. Its manifesto 
promised: ‘.in case of an urgent need to protect citizens’ property and values 
and state sovereignty, we will consider leaving the EU and Eurozone’ (Ibid.: 1).
As a party, the SNS fights for the rights of the nation state and labels others 
‘irresponsible’ and unworthy of assistance. In 2012, it proclaimed: ‘Various EU 
directives reduce the rights of individual countries in sovereign areas, such as 
the competencies and rights of parliament and the Slovak government guar‑
anteed by the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. We disapprove of the false 
rescue of the European Monetary Union and of its change into a debt ‑ridden and 
unprofitable union. We say “no” to the endless increase in public debt resulting 
from “helping” irresponsible countries’ (Ibid.: 2).
It is worth mentioning that these appeals against a solidarity contribution 
to the EFSF also enhanced the widespread Slovak self ‑image (self ‑stereotype) 
as a nation of poor people who had been tightening their belts for too long.7
As we have noted, the Eurosceptical appeals of nationalist parties were not 
rewarded with election votes – in either the 2012 early general election or the 
2014 EP election. These outcomes also indicated a decline in the salience of the 
nationalist agenda, which was the key policy of the SNS as a typical single ‑issue 
party. Nationalism connected with anti ‑EU positions was no longer appealing 
enough. This was probably also because of the pro ‑EU bias that could be found 
among SNS voters as well (for more details see Gyárfášová – Krivý 2013).
According to the typology of Eurosceptical positions proposed by Kopecky 
and Mudde, the SNS and ĽSNS can be categorised as “Euro ‑rejects” (Ko pecky – 
Mudde 2002). Their positions remain negative when it comes to both dimen‑
7 For example, the Slovak National Party (SNS) used the slogan: ‘A Greek pension is € 1,600, an Italian 
teacher earns € 2,000. And where are we Slovaks?’
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sions of the typology: they are not in favour of the EU at the level of diffuse sup‑
port for EU integration or specific support through the practice of EU policies. 
As for the sources of their Euroscepticism, nationalistic parties make appeals 
related to sovereignty and cultural divisions. Though they highlight some eco‑
nomic issues, this is more at the level of threats to the national interest and/or 
identity than rational cost ‑benefit calculations.
The Neoliberal Version: the EU as the Road to Socialism
For liberals, the EU, with its solidarity and bailout plan, is irrational and denies 
rational free market economic principles. The SaS also rejects deeper integra‑
tion since this ‘can lead to a reduction of the sovereignty of Member States’ 
(Volebný program SaS., 2012: 56). The party, thus, supports applying ‘stricter 
and enforceable sanctions to not only small or less important states but also 
the EU giants, Germany and France’ (Ibid.).
SaS’s neo ‑liberal attitude has met with a positive response from the younger 
generation, which is rich in social capital. On the other hand, the party is not 
supported by those marginalised by integration. This type of Euroscepticism 
is based on economic reductionism and “worship” for the invisible hand of 
the market. SaS’s argument has two dimensions: the first is moral; it sees the 
bailout as a moral hazard because it punishes those who comply with the rules 
and ‘the European Union has taken the path of supporting the irresponsible 
at the expense of those responsible’ (Všetci za Brusel…, 2014: 4). The second 
is economic and holds that in any case these measures are not efficient and ‘we 
need to (1) keep the internal market (2) repair the mistakes, in particular, in the 
context of the Monetary Union, (3) avoid the risks of unnecessary centralisation 
(banking, fiscal, political union)’ (Ibid.: 9). These positions trap these liberals 
into national egoism and chauvinism. On this basis, one might be quite scepti‑
cal about the liberal nature of the party because Euroscepticism does not befit 
those liberals who have positioned themselves within the Group of the Alliance 
of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). The decision of SaS’s only MEP, 
Richard Sulik to move to the European Conservatives and Reformists Group 
(ECR) was, thus, a logical step.
Again applying the Kopecký – Mudde typology (2002), we may see SaS as 
genuine EU ‑sceptics since they support EU integration at the level of ideas 
and ideals, however, they are critical of specific EU practices such as the EFSF 
mechanism. They also oppose too much harmonisation and centralisation 
within the EU. The sources of this Euroscepticism are at least twofold: political 
and economic based on a clearly neo ‑liberal background that rejects the ideas 
of solidarity and political union.
SaS continued its consistent criticism of the EU in the 2014 European cam‑
paign while vehemently refuting the label of Euroscepticism. In addition to criti‑
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cising the bailout fund and other aspects of economic integration, liberals gave 
voice to a very extensive range of Euro ‑myths about quotas on flushing toilets 
and high ‑powered vacuums and a ban on sugar ‑enhanced juices and the like. 
Moreover, SaS titled its party manifesto ‘Everyone’s for Brussels; we’re for you,’ 
reinforcing the widespread stereotypes of “them in Brussels” and “us at home” 
and a “Brussels doesn’t matter to us” attitude (SaS party manifesto, 2014).
In the 2014 EP election, SaS received 6.7% of votes, sending its leader Richard 
Sulík to EP. This was a slightly better result than the one recorded by the party in 
the 2012 general election, but much lower than its showing in the 2010 general 
election (12.1%). The nationalists, in contrast, did not reach the 5% threshold.
2014 EP Election Results
Although the governing party Smer ‑SD won the election with 24% of the vote, 
its performance fell well short of the one five years earlier (not to mention its 
success in the 2012 early parliamentary elections where it had achieved 44%). 
Smer ‑SD now has four MEPs, who strengthen the EU Socialist Group. The 
centre ‑right Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) and Slovak Democratic 
and Christian Union – Democratic Party (SDKÚ ‑DS) each successfully defended 
two seats. The Party of the Hungarian Community also remains in the EP al‑
though it only has one seat. These three parties are established members of the 
European People’s Party (EPP). The newcomers to the EP with just one member 
each are Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO) and NOVA 
(both joining the ECR group) as well as Most ‑Híd (EPP) and SaS (initially an 
ALDE member, which changed to ECR a few months after the election). These 
results reflect the current situation on the Slovak political scene, with a strong 
party on the Left and a fragmented centre ‑right spectrum. We must, however, 
note the difficulty of drawing far ‑reaching conclusions about current levels of 
support for individual parties based on these results. This is not only because of 
the critically low voter turnout, but due to the fact that these elections were not 
contested by the newly established Sieť (Network) party, which is performing 
significantly better in public opinion polls than any of the centre ‑right parties.
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table 1: Election results for three EP elections in slovakia
% of  valid votes number of seats in EP
2004 2009 2014 2004 2009 2014
Smer- SD 16.0 32.0 24.1 3 5 4
KDH 16.2 10.9 13.2 3 2 2
SDKú-DS 17.1 17.0 7.8 3 2 2
NOVA-KDS-OKS X X 6.8 X X 1
SaS X 4.6 6.7 X 0 1
SMK 13.2 11.3 6.5 2 2 1
Most-Híd X X 5.8 X X 1
TIP X X 3.8 X X 0
SNS 2.0 5.6 3.6 0 1 0
ĽS-NS X X 1.7 X x 0
HZDS 17.0 9.0 x 3 1 0
Notes: X = Party did not exist or did not run.
Source: Statistical Office of the SR.
Why Didn’t Euroscepticism succeed in the EP Election?
Slovakia has attracted expert attention more for its critically low voter turnout 
than for the election results themselves. In 2004, that turnout reached 17%; 
five years later it had increased to 19.6% only to sink to an all ‑time low in 
2014. What were the reasons for this non ‑participation? The Institute for Pub‑
lic Affairs (IVO) asked this question in a representative post ‑election survey.8 
Although such survey ‑based ex ‑post self ‑explanations and rationalisations 
have methodological limits, the responses point to some interesting findings 
and comparisons. The most frequently stated reasons for abstention related 
specifically to the EP elections and the EU: 39% of non ‑voters expressed those 
reasons in an open ‑ended survey question (Table 2). IVO conducted a similar 
survey after the 2009 EP elections when EU ‑related abstention factors were re‑
ported by only 16% of the then non ‑voters. Instead, the most common responses 
related to domestic politics or politics in general rather than the EP elections 
specifically (for example, political frustration, dissatisfaction, disenchantment 
and the like). As such, we can conclude that in recent years, the reasons for 
ignoring the EP elections have been “Europeanised”; they are anchored less in 
domestic politics and more in the meaning and implications of the specific elec‑
tion, EU institutions and last but not least, the work of MEPs. This also means 
8 The Institute for Public Affairs (IVO) conducted a survey of a representative sample of 1,000 respond-
ents – adult residents of Slovakia shortly after the EP election in early June 2014.
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that there are now more pronounced complaints against the EU itself. On the 
other hand, compared to 2009, factors related to general distrust of politicians 
have weakened. At the same time, the 2014 survey repeatedly confirmed that 
abstention is not related to a lack of information. Rather, the issue was a lack 
of relevance, thus confirming the second ‑order election theory – the view that 
less is at stake – which was identified by K. Reif and H. Schmitt more than 30 
years ago (Reif – Schmitt 1980).
table 2: self ‑declared reasons for abstention in the EP election 2014 (in %)
objective reasons (illness, needing to travel, work etc)  28 (30)
not interested in voting generally; abstention as a policy (‘I never show up’; ‘I’m not 
interested in politics.’) 23 (29)
Reservations about this particular election, the Eu, EP and/or MEPs (‘…because senior 
politicians get a good rest in EP for big money’; ‘in all these years, no MEP has ever come 
to visit us and inform us about what they have done for our benefit and our community’; ‘I 
don’t even know their policies and how they work’; ‘I have no confidence in parliament, and 
I’m disappointed by the way our representatives work in EP’; ‘I don’t understand why I should 
vote’; ‘these elections are important for the politicians, not for voters.’)
39 (16)
Distrust of politicians in general (‘Politicians have disappointed me ‑ promises, promises ... 
and still the same faces’; ‘I’m not interested in politics’; ‘I do know the politicians and I don’t 
trust them, I have been disappointed so many times that I don’t trust them’; ‘It’s just a waste 
of time; all of them are the same, and they mislead the public.’)
5 (11)
lack of information, insufficient campaigning (‘I don’t understand how European institu‑
tions work’; ‘there was no campaign.’) 1 (6)
i do not know, do not remember 4 (8)
Note: Open -ended question with a maximum of one response. The quotes in italics are taken from ques-
tionnaire responses. Figures in brackets are from 2009.
Source: Institute for Public Affairs, 2009 and 2014.
Interestingly, these people’s critical attitudes were not reflected in Euro ‑critical 
voices and votes for Eurosceptical parties. Rather, people expressed their opin‑
ions and criticisms of the EU and EP through abstention. Furthermore, many of 
these citizens were not convinced about the relevance of European elections. In 
their view, therefore, the problem was not the “second ‑order ‑ness” of the Euro‑
pean elections, but rather their uselessness and irrelevance. As such, they did 
not even endorse parties promising consistent criticism or rejection of the EU.
EU elections are usually understood as the most sophisticated level of elec‑
tions where participation is primarily the result of cognitive mobilisation (cf. 
van der Eijk – Franklin 1996; Franklin 2007). This can also be confirmed by 
looking at the regional and socio ‑demographic distribution of electoral partici‑
pation in Slovakia: participation was above average in the capital, Bratislava, 
which has the highest concentration of social capital. From a socio ‑demographic 
point of view, the differentiating features were education and age in particular. 
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The strongest constituencies were people aged over 55 years while the weakest 
bracket was 18–24‑years old. People with a university education participated 
more often than those with only a primary education.
In terms of the stability vs. volatility of voting behaviour, we can distinguish 
three groups essentially: a) party ‑loyal voters; b) “swinging” voters; and c) 
abstaining voters (non ‑voters). Turning to the EP elections and specific voting 
trends related to second ‑order elections, we find that the phenomenon of trans‑
ferred votes (“swinging voters”) is prevalent in many countries. Electorates of‑
ten use these elections to express dissatisfaction and “punish” their government 
and ruling parties, particularly if the European election is held in the middle of 
a national electoral cycle and the ruling parties are highly unpopular (due to the 
so ‑called mid ‑term slump). On the other hand, electoral gains are recorded by 
smaller parties (fringe Eurosceptical parties) which utilise the Eurosceptical, 
anti ‑EU mobilisation. As several studies have shown (cf. Reif – Schmitt 1980, 
Marsh 1998, Franklin 2007), the reason lies in sincere rather than strategic 
voting (“voting with the heart”) because – again – less is at stake. Extremist 
and Eurosceptical parties mobilise voters by riding on a wave of dissatisfaction 
with the EU, but this may only be a “placeholder” for dissatisfaction with solu‑
tions at national level. The 2014 EP elections provide clear evidence of these 
phenomena in many countries. The electoral success of the parties would not 
have been possible without the mobilising of voters from mainstream camps.
Slovakia is a different case: a post ‑election survey did not confirm significant 
voter shifts between the political parties. In other words, there was considerable 
consistency between the election results at European and national levels. The 
outcomes for the political parties in the European elections were determined 
by their ability to mobilise their own followers rather than to gain the back‑
ing of “flighty” voters. A high percentage of voters in the EP elections recently 
noted that they would select the same party at national level (Table 3).9 The 
proportion of party loyalists ranged from 100% in the case of the Party of the 
Hungarian Community (SMK) to 62% for both the Slovak Democratic and 
Christian Union ‑Democratic Party, which is declining in popularity, and the 
relatively new political entity – Ordinary People and Independent Personalities 
(OĽaNO). Voters who would not select the same party did not intend to switch 
to any particular party but were rather undecided or did not plan to vote in the 
general election.
9 This is based on a combination of voters' choices in the EP election and their voting intention in a po-
tential upcoming general election.
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table 3: consistency between EP election voting and party support at 
national level (voting intention in general elections)
Party supported
in the EP election
Party loyalty 
(intention to support 
the same party in the 
general election, in %)
SMK 100
SaS 88
Smer- SD 86
KDH 85
NOVA-KDS-OKS 80
Most-Híd 78
SDKú-DS 62
OĽaNO 62
Note: Only includes parties which entered EP in 2014.
Source: EES 2014.
To summarise voting trends among Slovak voters in the 2014 EP election, we 
may say:
• In 2014, there was no major volatility (i.e. neither deep nor superficial vari‑
ability) between the national and European levels = > the election results 
were mostly determined by different level of mobilisation, and not the ability 
of the parties to attract swinging voters;10 
• Euroscepticism did not mobilise Slovak voters, and many of those who did 
not show up to the polls explained their abstention through their critical 
stances towards the EU and/or EP. In other words, they were critical of the 
EU but did not express their views by casting a vote for any of the EU ‑critical 
parties; and
• Voting decisions in the EP elections replicated voting choices at national 
level, however with a substantially lower turnout; Slovakia’s Euro ‑gap11 
reached 46 percentage points.
the Eu agenda for Parties and Voters
The EP elections provide a unique laboratory test when it comes to the com‑
parative analysis of voting behaviour and political communication in “older” 
and “newer” post ‑Communist member states. One general pattern has emerged 
10 The same was true for the 2009 EP election. For more details, see Gyárfášová (2009).
11 The Euro -gap is the difference between the turnout in first -order and second -order elections. In the 
2012 parliamentary election, the turnout equalled 59.1 % of eligible voters.
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across all three elections so far: in spite of their years of yearning for EU mem‑
bership, citizens of post ‑Communist countries have not been very enthusiastic 
about exercising their newly acquired rights as EU citizens. The average voter 
turnout has been significantly lower than in the older EU member states. New 
EU citizens from post ‑Communist countries have, thus, relegated the “second‑
‑order” elections to an even lower position.
The 2014 elections also showed that after a decade of EU membership, the 
profiles of political parties on the EU agenda are slowly emerging. In the current 
configuration, the centre ‑left party Smer ‑SD has a clearly pro ‑European profile 
while the fragmented centre ‑right party spectrum is closer to the Euro ‑critical 
pole. As has been mentioned, among the mainstream parties we can also iden‑
tify two different modes of Euroscepticism. Around the time of Slovakia’s EU 
accession, experts clearly ranked the centre ‑right SDKÚ ‑DS as the most pro ‑EU 
political party, but in 2010 it was replaced in this role by Smer ‑SD.12 However, 
commentators have also pointed to a certain shallowness and largely instrumen‑
tal character to Smer’s Euro ‑optimism. Nevertheless, the debate on the EU is 
more present and visible than in 2009 (Gabrižová – Geist 2014: 24). The recent 
correlation between left‑ and right ‑wing orientations and pro ‑EU and anti ‑EU 
positions need not be fixed.
Another view of the political parties’ positions on the substantive issues 
on the European agenda is offered by the EUvox project.13 Within this project, 
domestic experts coded the positions of the 10 most relevant Slovak political 
parties on 30 European agenda issues that were divided across three axes: eco‑
nomic, social and cultural. It was found that across 30 different statements, the 
greatest consensus was reached about Slovakia’s membership of the Economic 
and Monetary Union and the rejection of tax harmonisation and redistribution 
via Euro ‑funds. The most controversial issue was the bailout, that is, whether 
the member states should provide assistance to countries finding themselves in 
a budget crisis. EUvox also revealed some incoherence and inconsistencies in the 
positions of the political parties. Moreover, the parties did not have positions 
on many issues (e.g. environmental matters and common security policies). The 
project clearly identified extreme ‑right nationalistic party ĽS ‑NS as the most 
anti ‑EU party followed by the radical nationalistic SNS and neo ‑liberal SaS.14 
12 Chapel Hill Expert Survey Series, 2006 and 2010. See http://www.unc.edu/~gwmarks/data_pp.php
13 EUVOX was a EU -wide voting advice application (VAA) for the 2014 European Parliament elections. Its 
purpose was to help citizens select the political party best matching their own policy preferences and 
enable them to quickly access information about the positions of all relevant parties contesting these 
crucial elections. For more details, visit: www.euvox.eu
14 This could be seen from several indicators, but it was most evident from party positions on the state-
ment “Overall, EU membership has been a bad thing for Slovakia.”
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To what extent are voters able to decode parties’ positions on EU issues? 
Based on an EES post ‑election survey,15 we observed in 2009 that more than 
30% of respondents could not indicate the position of the political parties on 
the anti ‑EU vs. pro ‑EU axis (Gyárfášová 2009). By 2014, this awareness had 
definitely increased: “do not know” responses were about 10% on average. 
However, there was relatively little differentiation among the parties’ positions 
remained (Table 4). SaS was not seen as Eurosceptical at all; unfortunately we 
do not have results for SNS. Nevertheless, we can say that though there was 
more awareness of party positions on the EU agenda, the differences among 
the parties were not very significant to the public.
In addition, we may point to an interesting phenomenon that is evident 
when we compare two other levels of party evaluation: on the one hand, voters 
perceived their preferred parties to be far more pro ‑EU than the general public 
did. On the other hand, voters saw themselves as being far less pro ‑European 
than the parties which they voted for in the EP elections. This “mismatch” de‑
serves more attention in future surveys.
table 4: Positions of political parties on the Eu issue as perceived by the 
public (measured on a 0–10 scale)16
Party 
Party’s position on Eu 
integration ‑ as seen 
by the public
Party’s position ‑ as 
seen by its supporters 
in the EP elections
Voters’ self‑placement
NOVA 4.6 7.5 4.5
Smer-SD 4.5 8.0 4.7
OĽaNO 4.2 6.9 4.1
KDH 3.8 7.5 4.6
SaS 3.6 7.4 4.9
Most-Híd 3.6 6.7 5.3
SDKú-DS 3.3 6.8 4.3
SMK 2.9 8.1 3.5
Note: Only includes parties which entered EP in 2014.
Source: EES 2014.
These findings show that there is very little congruence among the public and 
party supporters when it comes to perceptions of the parties. Further, the low 
level of differentiation in perceptions of the parties could be one factor influenc‑
15 For more details, visit: http://eeshomepage.net/ees-2009-study.
16 The wording of the question was as follows: ‘Some say that European unification should be pushed 
further. Others say it has already gone too far. What is your opinion? Please give your views on a scale 
from 0 to 10 where 0 means unification “has already gone too far” and 10 means it “should be pushed 
further.” What number on this scale best describes the party’s position?’
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ing voting choices. Eurosceptical appeals are not visible to voters they do not 
follow them. Moreover, voters see their preferred parties as being more pro ‑EU 
than they would rate themselves.
conclusions
Signs of the rising relevance of the EU agenda along with growing Euroscepti‑
cism in Slovak politics cannot be overlooked. Among the reasons for these shifts 
are crises related to the euro and/or debt as well as a quest for solidarity, which 
is not popular, especially when citizens feel obliged to show solidarity with those 
who are richer and better off. Yet, despite the fact that EU issues were more vis‑
ible and two different types of Euroscepticism could be identified, Euro ‑critical 
appeals did not mobilise Slovak voters in the 2014 EP elections and Slovakia – for 
the third time – finished with the lowest voter turnout across all the member 
states. This study has been able to identify several explaining factors:
The EU arena is still perceived as a sphere where there is less at stake, and 
therefore the main political “battlefield” and source of power is politics at na‑
tional level. Political parties behave accordingly: in spite of the greater visibility 
of EU content, the EU contest is very weak, and even Eurosceptical positions 
are separate monologues rather than part of a political debate or discourse. The 
positions of most political parties are fuzzy on many issues, and in some cases 
they simply do not exist.
So far, the politicisation of EU issues – in the case of ESFS, for example – 
seems to represent a temporary episode rather than a long ‑term shift, and the 
impact on voting behavior has been weak.
The relevance of the “EU factor” is increasing, but it has yet to be fully devel‑
oped as an independent dividing issue in the political competition; it is stuck 
between its previous irrelevance and expected future salience.
Political parties’ stances on the issue are still not very visible to the public. 
Moreover, the public does not see big differences among the parties. Voters 
perceive their chosen parties as being more pro ‑EU than they are themselves.
The EU agenda has been used more successfully as a mass mobilisation tool 
when parties have managed to invoke the EU as either a guarantee of improved 
economic conditions or a scapegoat for economic misery. This was the case for 
the governing Smer ‑SD party, which was the clear winner of the 2014 EP elec‑
tion. The pro ‑European stance of the Slovak Social Democrats instrumentalises 
the EU for several purposes: to strengthen the image of the party with a guar‑
antee of social stability and security as well as a guarantee of political stability. 
As such, the party defines itself in opposition to those adopting anti ‑European 
attitudes in order to pursue their own political interests. The Social Democrats, 
thus, draw an image of the EU as a co ‑protector of the national interest. Though 
the EU ‑optimistic Smer ‑SD party was indeed the unambiguous winner of the 
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EP election, this landslide victory was not recorded thanks to its pro ‑EU stance. 
Rather, it was due to its offer of social security and better economic conditions. 
The EU served as an additional pragmatic instrument to appeal to an electorate 
yearning for more social and economic security. And voters rewarded this ap‑
proach. This implies that when it comes to perceptions of the EU, a utilitarian 
model (still) has more explanatory force (“it’s for the economy, stupid!”) than 
any other approach. However, enjoying the benefits of the EU does not give 
people any motivation to participate in EU democracy.
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